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In pure population problems, a single resource is to be distributed equally among the
agents in a society, and the social planner chooses population size(s) and per-capita con-
sumption(s) for each resource constraint and set of feasible population sizes within the
domain of the solution. This paper shows that a weak condition regarding the possible
choice of a zero population is necessary and sucient for the rationalizability of a solution
by a welfarist social ordering. In addition, solutions that are rationalized by critical-level
generalized utilitarianism are characterized by means of a homogeneity property.
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Pure population problems can be used to assess the performance of population principles.1
In the pure population problem considered in this paper, a given amount of a single resource
is to be distributed equally among the individuals who are alive. The policy decision to
be made is the choice of population size and a level of per-capita consumption. An equal
distribution of consumption is assumed in order to focus on the population issue; this is
plausible if individuals have identical concave utility functions.
A life, taken as a whole, is worth living if lifetime utility is above neutrality. The
standard normalization in the population-ethics literature is a utility level of zero to rep-
resent a neutral life.2 Given this normalization, the following solutions to pure population
problems have been proposed and discussed in the literature.
In the discrete case, the average-utilitarian solution3 recommends an optimal popu-
lation size of one, regardless of the amount of the resource available.4 If population size is
a continuous variable, the average-utilitarian solution does not exist.
The classical-utilitarian solution selects the population size that maximizes the sum
of dierences between the utilities of those alive and the utility level representing a neutral
life. Given the zero normalization for neutrality, classical utilitarianism can be rationalized
by a value function which is equal to total utility.5 Unlike average utilitarianism, classical
utilitarianism selects optimal population sizes that increase as the amount of the resource
increases. Furthermore, classical utilitarianism produces a well-dened solution regardless
of whether population size is treated as a continuous or a discrete variable.
The class of critical-level utilitarian solutions generalizes classical utilitarianism. Ac-
cording to the rationalization of a critical-level utilitarian solution, states of the world
are ranked by comparing the sums of the dierences between individual utility levels and
a x e dcritical level of lifetime utility. If the critical level is equal to zero (neutrality),
classical utilitarianism results. We recommend the choice of a critical level above neutral-
ity in order to avoid the repugnant conclusion (Part [1976, 1982, 1984]). A population
principle leads to the repugnant conclusion if, for any state of the world where everyone
alive experiences an arbitrarily high level of well-being, there exists a better state with a
suciently large population where each person's utility is above but arbitrarily close to
1 See Blackorby and Donaldson [1979, 1984].
2 See Broome [1993] for a discussion of neutrality and its normalization to zero.
3 See, for instance, Blackorby and Donaldson [1984], Bossert [1990a,b], and Hurka [1982] for discussions
of average utilitarianism and its generalizations.
4 Average utilitarianism can be amended to allow for the possibility of an optimal population size of
zero if the amount of the resource becomes very low.
5 Dasgupta [1993, 1994] uses a negative utility level to represent neutrality. In that case, total utility
is not the value function for classical utilitarianism.
1neutrality. Classical utilitarianism leads to the repugnant conclusion, but average utilitar-
ianism and critical-level utilitarianism with a positive critical level do not. If critical-level
utilitarianism is applied to the pure population problem, the optimal population size is
lower for higher values of the critical level.6 Again, the critical-level utilitarian solutions
are well-dened for both discrete and continuous population sizes. See Blackorby, Bossert,
and Donaldson [1995b, 1996, 1997] and Blackorby and Donaldson [1984] for discussions of
critical-level utilitarianism.
All of the above rationalizations can be generalized by applying a continuous, increas-
ing transformation to the individual utilities. This allows for the possibility of expressing
inequality aversion in utilities. For example, critical-level generalized utilitarianism uses
a value function that is equal to the sum of dierences between transformed individual
utilities and the transformed critical level.
A feature that is common to all of the solutions to pure population problems men-
tioned above (and others|see, for instance, Hurka [1983] and Ng [1986]) is that they
are rationalizable: the solution selects the optimal population-size-per-capita-consumption
pair(s) according to some social ordering.7 However, pure population problems are, by
denition, choice problems, and this raises the question whether there might be other so-
lutions with attractive properties that are left out of consideration by restricting attention
to rationalizable solutions.
The rationalizability of a choice function is a problem that has its origins in the lit-
erature on consumer theory; see, for instance, Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson [1995a],
Bossert [1993], Gale [1960], Houthakker [1950], Hurwicz and Richter [1971], Kihlstrom,
Mas-Colell, and Sonnenschein [1976], Peters and Wakker [1994], Rose [1958], Samuelson
[1938, 1948], and Uzawa [1960, 1971] for discussions of that issue. Extensions to more
general choice problems can be found, for example, in Arrow [1959], Baigent and Gaertner
[1996], Bossert [1995], Hansson [1968], Richter [1966, 1971], and Sen [1971, 1993]. The
rationalizability of various group-decision procedures (such as bargaining solutions) has
been analyzed in contributions such as Bossert [1994], Lensberg [1987], and Peters and
Wakker [1991].
The purpose of this paper is to examine the rationalizability issue in the context of
the pure population problem. It turns out that, due to the structure of pure population
problems, ecient solutions are rationalizable if and only if a weak condition regarding the
choice of zero as an optimal population size is satised. If zero were excluded as a possible
population size, all ecient solutions would be rationalizable. However, excluding zero as
6 This is true in any population problem. See Blackorby and Donaldson [1984].
7 Usually, social orderings dened on pairs of population sizes and per-capita utilities are employed,
assuming that the utility function dened on consumption levels is the same for everybody. Under a weak
eciency requirement which we impose throughout the paper, it does not matter whether per-capita
consumption or per-capita utility is used. See Section 3 for a discussion.
2a possibility for all amounts of the resource would be an implausible assumption|for very
low values of the resource, it seems natural to allow for the possibility that it is best not
to have anybody alive.
The natural set of possible population sizes is the set of nonnegative integers. In
some economic models, however, it is convenient to treat population size as a continu-
ous variable|any nonnegative real number is feasible. Our main result regarding the
rationalizability of solutions to pure population problems is valid for either of these two
possibilities. In Section 4, however, a homogeneity property is used, which is only mean-
ingful if the set of possible population sizes consists of the nonnegative real numbers. For
discrete population sizes, the condition can only be approximately satised due to integer
problems.
Section 2 introduces our notation and a formal denition of the pure population
problem discussed in this paper. Rationalizability is dened in Section 3, and a necessary
and sucient condition for the rationalizability of solutions to pure population problems
is presented. Section 4 discusses rationalizability by critical-level generalized utilitarian
social orderings. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2. Pure Population Problems
The set of nonnegative integers is denoted by Z+, and the set of all (nonnegative, positive)
real numbers is R (R+, R++). The set of feasible population sizes is denoted by N,w h e r e
either N = Z+ or N = R+. Except for Section 4, it does not matter which of those two
options is chosen. Let N++ = Nnf 0 g .
Apure population problem is dened by the total amount of the resource ! 2R ++
available. Each pure population problem ! induces a set of feasible population-size-per-
capita-consumption pairs dened by
B(!)=f ( n;x) j n 2N ++ and 0  x  !=ng[f (0;0)g: (2.1)
The choice of x = 0 in the case of a zero population is arbitrary and of no consequence for
the results of the paper.
Let P+ = N++ R +,a n dl e tP=P +[f(0;0)g. The set of all nonempty subsets of
P is denoted by 2P. A solution to the pure population problem is a choice function dened
on R++, that is, a function c:R++ −! 2P such that, for all ! 2R ++, c(!)  B(!).
A requirement which we impose on c throughout the paper is a weak eciency con-
dition. Eciency requires that the entire amount of the resource available is distributed
by a solution.
Eciency: For all ! 2R ++, for all n 2N ++, for all x;y 2R +such that x>y ,i f
( n;x) 2 B(!), then (n;y) 62 c(!).
33. Rationalizable Solutions
As o l u t i o ncis rationalizable if and only if there exists an ordering8  on P such that, for
all ! 2R ++,
c(!)=f ( n;x) 2 B(!) j (n;x)  (m;y) for all (m;y) 2 B(!)g: (3.1)
That is, c is rationalizable if and only if there exists an ordering  such that, for each
! 2R ++, the choice function chooses the set of best elements in the feasible set B(!)
according to . In this case, we say that  rationalizes c or  is a rationalization of c.
The strict preference relation and the indierence relation corresponding to  are denoted
by  and  respectively.
The eciency assumption imposed on c implies that rationalizing orderings can be
chosen such that they possess the following monotonicity property (see Theorem 1).
Monotonicity: For all (n;x);(m;y) 2P,i fn=mand x>y ,t h e n( n;x)  (m;y).
The direct revealed preference relation Rc corresponding to the choice function c is
dened as follows. For all (n;x);(m;y) 2P ,( n;x)Rc(m;y) if and only if there exists
! 2R ++ such that (n;x) 2 c(!)a n d( m;y) 2 B(!).
The following axiom imposes a restriction on the choice of zero as an optimal pop-
ulation size. Zero consistency requires that if a zero population size is chosen for some
amount of the resource, then zero must be the only chosen population size for all lower
levels of the resource.
Zero Consistency: If there exists  ! 2R ++ such that (0;0) 2 c( !), then c(!)=f (0;0)g
for all !< ! .
This axiom only imposes a restriction on choices that involvea zero population. Therefore,
it is considerably weaker than the usual axioms that are required for rational choice. That
this condition is necessary and sucient for rationalizability is a consequence of the special
structure of pure population problems. We obtain
Theorem 1: Let c be an ecient solution. c is rationalizable by a monotonic social
ordering if and only if c satises zero consistency.
8 An ordering is a reﬂexive, transitive, and complete binary relation.
4Proof: (a) Only if: Suppose c is ecient, and let  be a monotonic ordering that ratio-
nalizes c.
Suppose zero consistency is violated. Then there exist  !;! 2R ++ and (n;x) 2P +
such that !< ! ,( 0 ;0) 2 c( !), and (n;x) 2 c(!). (0;0) is feasible for any possible amount
of the resource, and in particular for !. Therefore, because  rationalizes c, it follows that
(n;x)  (0;0). Because (n;x)i sf e a s i b l ef o rt h ep r o b l e m! , it must be feasible for the
higher amount of the resource  !. Therefore, because (0;0) is chosen for  ! and (n;x)i sa t
least as good as (0;0) according to the rationalizing ordering, it follows that (n;x) 2 c( !).
But this contradicts eciency because nx  !< ! .
(b) If: To prove the `if' part of the theorem, we establish the existence of a monotonic
ordering that rationalizes c. Suppose c is ecient and satises zero consistency. Dene
the relation  on P as follows. For all (n;x);(m;y) 2P,( n;x)  (m;y) if and only if





n = m and x  y

: (3.2)
First, we show that  is a quasi-ordering.9 That  is reﬂexive follows immediately.
To show that  is transitive, suppose (n;x)  (m;y)a n d( m;y)  (r;z)f o rs o m e
( n;x);(m;y);(r;z) 2P . We can assume (n;x) 6=( m;y)a n d( m;y) 6=( r;z) because all
other cases are trivial. According to the denition of , we can distinguish four cases.
1.) 9t 2R +such that x  t and (n;t)Rc(m;y), and 9s 2R +such that y  s and
(m;s)Rc(r;z). The following ve subcases arise according to which of the population sizes
in these pairs are equal to zero (note that these are the only possibilities because the case
(n;x)=( m;y)o r( m;y)=( r;z) is ruled out).
(i) n =0a n dr=0 .I nt h i sc a s e ,( n;x)=( 0 ;0)  (0;0) = (r;z) follows immediately
because  is reﬂexive.
(ii) n =0a n dm6 =0a n dr6 = 0. It follows that (n;x)=( 0 ;0) and, because x  t,
t = 0. Therefore, (0;0)Rc(m;y). Let !; ^ ! 2R ++ be such that (0;0) 2 c(!), my  !,
(m;s) 2 c(^ !), and rz  ^ !.B y e  c i e n c y , ms =^ ! . Furthermore, !  my  ms and,
therefore, !  ^ !.I f !=^ ! , it follows that (0;0) 2 c(^ !) and thus (n;x)=( 0 ;0)Rc(r;z),
which implies (n;x)  (r;z). The case !>^ !cannot occur because it would contradict
zero consistency.
(iii) n 6=0a n dm=0a n dr6 = 0. Analogously to (ii), (m;y)=( m;s)=( 0 ;0) and
hence (0;0)Rc(r;z). Let !; ^ ! 2R ++ be such that (n;t) 2 c(!), (0;0) 2 c(^ !), and rz  ^ !.
If !<^ ! , we obtain a contradiction to zero consistency. Therefore, !  ^ !, which implies
rz  !. Hence, (r;z) 2 B(!), and it follows that (n;t)Rc(r;z) and thus (n;x)  (r;z).
(iv) n 6=0a n dm6 =0a n dr= 0. Therefore, (r;z)=( 0 ;0). Let ! 2R ++ be such
that (n;t) 2 c(!). Because (0;0) 2 B(!), it follows that (n;t)Rc(0;0) = (r;z) and hence
(n;x)  (r;z).
9 A quasi-ordering is a reﬂexive and transitive, but not necessarily complete, binary relation.
5(v) n 6=0a n dm6 =0a n dr6 =0 .L e t!; ^ ! 2R ++ be such that (n;t) 2 c(!), my  !,
(m;s) 2 c(^ !), and rz  ^ !. Eciency implies ms =^ ! ,a n dw eo b t a i n!my  ms =^ !
rz. Therefore, (r;z) 2 B(!), and it follows that (n;t)Rc(r;z) and thus (n;x)  (r;z).
2.) n = m and x  y,a n dm=rand y  z. In this case, we obtain n = r and x  z
and thus (n;x)  (r;z).
3.) 9t 2R +such that x  t and (n;t)Rc(m;y), and m = r and y  z. Because
(m;y) 6=( r;z), it follows that m = r 6=0 . L e t!2R ++ be such that (n;t) 2 c(!)
and my  !. It follows that rz = mz  my  ! and, therefore, (r;z) 2 B(!). Hence,
(n;t)Rc(r;z), and we obtain (n;x)  (r;z).
4.) n = m and x  y,a n d9 t2R +such that y  t and (m;t)Rc(r;z). Therefore,
(n;t)Rc(r;z). Because x  y  t, this implies (n;x)  (r;z).
Next, it is shown that  satises monotonicity. Suppose n = m and x>y .B y
denition, (n;x)  (n;y). Suppose (n;y)  (n;x). Because y<x ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s e
that there exists t 2R +such that y  t and (n;t)Rc(n;x). Let ! 2R ++ be such that
(n;t) 2 c(!)a n dnx  !. Note that, because y 6= x, n 6= 0. Eciency implies nt = !,
and we obtain ny  nt = !  nx. This implies y  x, a contradiction. Therefore,
(n;x)  (n;y)=( m;y).
The next step is to show that  rationalizes c.L e t ! 2R ++ and (n;x) 2 c(!).
Therefore, (n;x)Rc(m;y) for all (m;y) 2 B(!) and hence (n;x)  (m;y) for all (m;y) 2
B(!). This establishes that
c(!) f ( n;x) 2 B(!) j (n;x)  (m;y) for all (m;y) 2 B(!)g: (3.3)
To complete the proof that  rationalizes c, it remains to be shown that
f(n;x) 2 B(!) j (n;x)  (m;y) for all (m;y) 2 B(!)gc ( ! ) : (3.4)
Suppose (n;x) 2 B(!)a n d( n;x)  (m;y) for all (m;y) 2 B(!). Let (r;z) 2 c(!)( n o t e
that c(!) is, by assumption, nonempty). If (r;z)=( n;x), we are done. Now suppose
(r;z) 6=( n;x). Because this excludes the case n = r = 0, there are three cases left to
consider.
1.) n =0a n dr6 = 0. Because n 6= r,( n;x)  (r;z) implies (0;0)Rc(r;z). Let
^ ! 2R ++ be such that (0;0) 2 c(^ !)a n drz  ^ !. Eciency implies rz = ! and, therefore,
!  ^ !.I f!=^ ! ,( n;x)=( 0 ;0) 2 c(!) by denition. If !<^ ! ,( n;x)=( 0 ;0) 2 c(!)b y
zero consistency.
2.) n 6=0a n dr= 0. Therefore, (0;0) 2 c(!). Because (n;x)  (r;z)=( 0 ;0) and
n 6= 0, it follows that there exists t 2R +such that x  t and (n;t)Rc(0;0). Let ^ ! 2R ++
be such that (n;t) 2 c(^ !). Zero consistency implies ^ !  !.
(i) If ^ ! = !,w eo b t a i n( n;t) 2 c(!), and eciency implies
nt = !: (3.5)
6Furthermore, because (n;x) 2 B(!), it follows that nx  !. Together with (3.5) and the
fact that x  t, it follows that x = t and hence (n;x) 2 c(!).
(ii) If ^ !>! , eciency can be used to obtain nx  nt =^ !>! , contradicting the
feasibility of (n;x) for the problem !.
3.) n 6=0a n dr6 = 0. There are two subcases.
(i) n = r and x  y. It follows that x>ybecause (n;x) 6=( r;z) by assumption.
This contradicts eciency.
(ii)9t 2R +such that x  t and (n;t)Rc(r;z). Let ^ ! 2R ++ be such that (n;t) 2 c(^ !)
and rz  ^ !. Using eciency, we obtain nt =^ !rz = !  nx  nt, which implies ^ ! = !
and t = x. Therefore, (n;x) 2 c(!).
This completes the proof that  is a monotonic quasi-ordering that rationalizes c.
Note that  is not necessarily complete. Therefore, it remains to be shown that  can be
extended to an ordering with the desired properties. Applying Richter's [1966] proof (which
uses Szpilrajn's [1930] extension of an antisymmetric quasi-ordering to an antisymmetric
ordering), we can nd an ordering   that rationalizes c.T o s e e t h a t  satises
monotonicity, note that Szpilrajn's extension procedure is applied to the antisymmetric
relation induced on the equivalence classes of  and, therefore, all strict preferences in
 that are due to the monotonicity requirement are preserved when extending  to .
The standard solutions proposed for pure population problems are rationalized by or-
derings that rank pairs of population sizes and per-capita utilities rather than per-capita
consumptions. Given eciency, this makes no dierence. Suppose U:R+ −! R is an
increasing utility function dened on individual consumption levels. This function is as-
sumed to be the same for all individuals. By eciency, only pairs of the form (n;!=n)
can be selected, and c induces a choice function on pairs of the form (n;U(!=n)). Con-
versely, because U is increasing and eciency is satised, c can be recovered uniquely from
knowledge of this choice function dened on population-size-per-capita-utility pairs.
4. Homogeneity and Critical-Level Generalized Utilitarianism
Suppose N = R+, that is, population size is treated as a continuous variable. In addition,
we restrict attention to solutions that select an interval of population sizes for each value
of the resource !. The following connectedness condition captures this assumption.
Connectedness: For all ! 2R ++,t h es e tf n2R +j9 x2R +such that (n;x) 2 c(!)g
is connected.
7Instead of requiring the above connectedness property with respect to chosen population
sizes, we could alternatively impose an analogous property with respect to chosen per-
capita consumptions. In the presence of eciency, these two requirements are equivalent,
and either of them implies that c(!) is a connected set for all ! 2R ++.
In this framework, a plausible property of a solution is homogeneity: if the amount of
the resource ! is multiplied by some positive number  and n 2R +is a chosen population
size for !,t h e nn is a chosen population size for !. This is a reasonable condition
because, in a pure population problem, the amount of the resource represents the carrying
capacity of the environment.
Homogeneity: For all !; 2R ++, for all n 2R +,





9y 2R +such that (n;y) 2 c(!)

: (4.1)
Together with zero consistency, homogeneity can be used to provide a characterization
of the critical-level generalized utilitarian solutions to pure population problems, provided
that there exists some amount of the resource for which a positive population size is chosen.
To dene these solutions formally, suppose that each person has the same continuous and
increasing utility function U:R+ −! R dened on possible consumption levels. A social
ordering  is a critical-level generalized utilitarian ordering if and only if there exist  2R
and a continuous and increasing function g:R− !Rwith g(0) = 0 such that, for all
(n;x);(m;y) 2P,





















The parameter  is the critical level of utility. For  = 0, we obtain classical generalized
utilitarianism. If the function g is (strictly) concave, the resulting ordering represents
(strict) inequality aversion in utilities. Because U and g are increasing, these orderings
satisfy monotonicity. We obtain
Theorem 2: Let c be an ecient and connected solution, and suppose there exists
^ ! 2R ++ and (n;x) 2P +such that (n;x) 2 c(^ !). c is rationalizable by a critical-
level generalized utilitarian social ordering if and only if c satises zero consistency and
homogeneity.
Proof: (a) Only if: Suppose  is a critical-level generalized utilitarian ordering that
rationalizes c. Theorem 1 implies that zero consistency is satised. To show that c is
homogeneous, let !; 2R ++ and n 2R +. It follows that there exists x 2R +such that






















8for all (m;y) 2 B(!). Because my  ! if and only if my  !,( ;y) 2 B(!)i fa n d












































for all (r;y) 2 B(!) which, in turn, is equivalent to (n;x) 2 c(!).
(b) If: Suppose c is ecient and connected and satises zero consistency and homo-
geneity, and a positive population size is chosen for some value of the resource available.
First, we show that we must have
(0;0) 62 c(!) (4.6)
for all ! 2R ++. By way of contradiction, suppose there exists ! 2R ++ such that
(0;0) 2 c(!). By assumption, there exists ^ ! 2R ++ such that (n;x) 2 c(^ !)f o rs o m e
( n;x) 2P + .C h o o s e m 2N ++ such that m^ !>! . Letting  = m^ !=!, homogeneity
implies (0;0) 2 c(m^ !). Because m^ !>! , this contradicts zero consistency.
Our next step is to show that there exists a continuous, increasing, and concave
function :R+ −! R such that the ordering dened by
(n;x)  (m;y)  ! n(x)  m(y) (4.7)
for all (n;x);(m;y) 2Prationalizes c. Connectedness implies that the set of chosen
population sizes is an interval for each ! 2R ++. Without loss of generality, suppose
this interval is closed (it is straightforward to adapt the construction below to cover the
other possibilities). Let [nL;n H]w i t hn Ln Hbe this interval for ! =1 . B ye  c i e n c y ,
the chosen population-size-per-capita-consumption pairs are of the form (n;1=n) for all





2 x−1 =nH if x 2 [0;1=nH);
x if x 2 [1=nH;1=nL];
(x +1 =nL)=2i f x 2 (1=nL;1).
(4.8)
 is continuous, increasing, and concave. Clearly, the ordering dened by (4.7) with the
function  as in (4.8) rationalizes the choice of the set f(n;1=n) j n 2 [nL;n H]gfrom the
feasible set B(1). By homogeneity and eciency, we obtain
c(!)=f ( !n;1=n) j n 2 [nL;n H]g (4.9)
for all ! 2R ++, and it follows that c is rationalized by the ordering in (4.7).
Finally, we use  to construct a critical level  and a function g as in the denition
of critical-level generalized utilitarianism. Let  x 2R +be such that ( x)=0( s u c ha
consumption level  x exists by denition of ). Because U is continuous and increasing,
9the image of U must be an interval of the form [a;b)w i t ha2Rand b 2Ror b = 1,a n d





y+ ( U − 1( a )) − a if y 2 (−1;a);
(U−1(y)) if y 2 [a;b);
y + (limz!b U−1(z))− b if y 2 [b;1);
(4.10)
if b = 1, gis dened by the rst two cases in (4.10). Now let g(y)= g ( y )− g (0) for all
y 2R . Dening  = U( x), it follows that
(x)= ( x )− ( x)= g ( U( x )) −  g(U( x)) =  g(U(x)) −  g() (4.11)
for all x 2R +and, hence,
(x)= g ( U( x )) −  g()= g ( U( x )) −  g(0) −  g()+ g(0) = g(U(x)) − g() (4.12)
for all x 2R + .N o t e t h a t g is continuous and increasing because U and  are and,
furthermore, g(0) = 0. Substituting (4.12) into (4.7), it follows that c is rationalized by a
critical-level utilitarian social ordering.
Zero consistency and homogeneity are independent. The choice function dened by
c(!)=f (0;0)g[f(n;x) 2P +jnx = !g for all ! 2R ++ satises homogeneity but violates
zero consistency. If c(!)=f (1;!)g for all ! 2R ++, zero consistency is satised but
homogeneity is violated. Note that the above examples satisfy eciency, connectedness,
and the requirement that a positive population size is chosen for some ^ ! 2R ++.
The assumption that a positive population size is chosen for some amount of the
resource is needed in Theorem 2. If there exists ^ ! 2R ++ such that (0;0) 2 c(^ !), the
argument in the proof implies that c(!)=f (0;0)g for all ! 2R ++. Suppose g and 
are such that c is rationalized by the corresponding critical-level generalized utilitarian







g ( U( !=n)) − g()

(4.13)
for all n;! 2R ++, which requires, because g is increasing, U(!=n) <for all n;! 2R ++.
But this is not possible if the utility function U is not bounded.
Note, however, that a continuous, increasing, and concave function  such that the
ordering given by (4.7) rationalizes the solution that always selects (0;0) as the only choice
does exist. To see this, let (x)=− 1 = ( x+ 1) for all x 2R + . But it is not possible to
nd a function g and a critical level  such that  can be written in the form required
for critical-level generalized utilitarianism, unless the utility function U is bounded from
above.
105. Concluding Remarks
This paper establishes necessary and sucient conditions for the rationalizability of solu-
tions to pure population problems. Only a weak consistency property regarding the choice
of a population size of zero is required to obtain the existence of a rationalizing ordering. If
a plausible homogeneity property is added, solutions that are rationalized by critical-level
generalized utilitarian social orderings are characterized. This latter result is restricted
to solutions that do not always select a population size of zero as the only choice for all
values of the resource.
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